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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines immigration cases arising in Florida for which
decisions were rendered from June 1996 through June 1997. These cases
discuss the recent changes in immigration law under the Illegal Immigration
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P.A., Miami, Florida. A past president and former general counsel of the American
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRLRA"),' and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 2 These
changes apply to the treatment of legal and undocumented aliens in the
United States, some of whom have criminal convictions. Congress and the
executive branch, through the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), have determined the
direction of immigration policy in the United States. This policy is
characterized by harsh treatment of illegal and legal immigrants in the
United States. New immigration provisions indicate tougher laws on
criminal aliens, as well as the withdrawal of meaningful discretionary relief
from all aliens. Other immigration laws seek to insulate federal immigration
decisions from judicial review. These policies not only target illegal aliens,
but also legal immigrants living in the United States who would otherwise
qualify for permanent residency or citizenship under previously existing
immigration laws. The highly publicized decision, involving the suspension
of deportation proceedings initiated by the federal government of
approximately 40,000 Nicaraguans living mostly in Florida, exemplifies
these changes.4
Across the country, states have followed suit and have been interpreting
some of these new provisions. With some exceptions in the area of criminal
prosecutions, federal and state courts in Florida are outlining hard-line
policies against legal and illegal aliens.
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON IMMIGRATION
A. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996
During 1996, the executive branch and the 104th Congress turned their
attention to immigration and, in some cases, radically altered relief available
to lawful residents and others in the United States. The wholesale
transformation of immigration law, under the guise of removing
undocumented and criminal aliens, became a priority for the Republican-led
Congress this past year. It was no surprise that one of the first changes in
1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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immigration law involved current exclusion and deportation laws. The
IRIRA directly abolished the separate exclusion and deportation hearings
and "replaced them with a uni[tary] removal proceeding." The IRIRA also
cut back legal safeguards which historically protected legal residents from
deportation. In some cases, long-term lawful permanent residents who have
extensive familial and community ties are now subject to deportation
without any relief available to them.
One of the most basic changes in relation to exclusion and deportation
proceedings was URIRA's modification of the "entry" doctrine.6 Before its
passage, "aliens who [had] entered the U.S. whether lawfully or unlawfully,
and who remain[ed], ... [were] subject to deportation [proceedings]." 7
Entry had been defined as: 1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the
United States, i.e., physical presence; 2) an inspection and admission by an
immigration officer; or 3) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the
nearest inspection point; coupled with 4) freedom from restraint.8 Before the
IIRIRA, both illegal and legal aliens who entered the United States enjoyed
the right to deportation proceedings before being forcefully expelled from
the United States. Under the IRIRA, aliens who are not inspected and
admitted by an immigration officer are deemed to be seeking admission and
are subject to exclusion under section 212(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), regardless of when they effected an entry into the
United States under prior law and how long they have actually lived here
after entry without inspection. 9
Another area of change has been in the treatment of criminal aliens.
Specifically, the IRIRA has changed the definition of "conviction."10
Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA now states:
5. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 9, N-J-B- v. Reno, _ F. Supp. _ (1 th Cir. 1997) (No.
97-4400).
6. H.R REP. No. 104-879, at 259 (1997).
7. DAviD S. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 166 (3d
ed. 1992).
8. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 25 (5th ed. 1994).
9. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 262 (1997). Section 1101(a)(13)(A), title 8 of the United
States Code states: "The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (Supp. I 1996).
10. H.R. REP. No. 104-879, at 262 (1997). The definition of "conviction" has been
broadened "for immigration law purposes to include all aliens who have admitted t6 or been
found to have committed crimes. This will make it easier to remove criminal aliens, regardless
of specific procedures in States for deferred adjudication or suspension of sentences." Id.
1997]
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The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal
judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has found the
alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed."
Additionally, section 101 (a)(48)(B) provides that any period imposed by the
court will be included as part of a term of imprisonment, reardless of
whether the court suspends the sentence or suspends execution. What is
more detrimental to aliens with criminal convictions is that these changes
will apply to "convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date
of the enactment of this Act."'13 Similarly, Congress has redefined the term
"aggravated felony" to include virtually any felony including theft, assault,
and small amounts of money or larceny transaction violations. 14 Since an
aggravated felon is barred from citizenship, as well as most forms of relief
from removal including political asylum, withhold of deportation, voluntary
departure, and cancellation of removal (formerly suspension of deportation),
the definitional change has enormous impact.
The statute also substantially restricts relief for persons who have
resided in the United States for long periods of time without any criminal
problems. Congress abolished the suspension of deportation, which required
a person to demonstrate seven years of continuous physical presence, good
moral character, and establish hardship to himself or his family, or show that
he is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident.' In its place,
11. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 322, 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. II 1996) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
§ 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A) (1994)).
12. Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
13. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 322(c),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
14. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 101(a)(43) (West Supp. 1997).
15. Id. § 1254(a)(1). The text of section 1254(a) provides:
[T]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in
case of an alien.., who.., is deportable under any law of the United
States... [and] has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date
of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or
[Vol. 22:149
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Congress established "cancellation of removal" which requires ten years of
continuous physical presence and the establishment of exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship but only to a United States citizen or a legal
permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.1 6 The alien's own hardship is
irrelevant.
17
A crucial part of the new legislation deals with the courts' power to
review INS decisions. Among them are the attemnts to limit the courts'
jurisdiction, as well as the scope of judicial review Normally, individuals
subject to removal by the Attorney General were able to seek relief from
deportation by the courts. However, section 242(g) of the INA now provides
that:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under
this Act. 19
Congress has also sought to eliminate review of discretionary decisions by
the Attorney General regarding aliens in proceedings. 20  In addition,
to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Id.
16. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 240A, 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. II 1996).
17. Id. Section 1229(b) states:
Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent
residents.
(1) In general. The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien -
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2),
or 237(a)(3); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Id.
18. Id. § 1252(g).
19. Id.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1996). Courts no longer have jurisdiction to
review "any judgment regarding the granting of relief' and "any other decision or action of the
1997]
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Congress has sought to limit the power of the federal courts to grant
injunctive relief.21
Congress and the INS have charted the future course of immigration
law in this country by limiting the courts' power to grant relief, and
facilitating the deportation of criminal aliens and countless others awaiting
permanent residency status. Altogether, the IIRIRA demonstrates a sharp
shift from the historical treatment of providing both legal and illegal aliens
due process of law.
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Following the Oklahoma City federal building bombing,22 the country
was faced with the growing danger of domestic terrorism. 23 Although
primarily designed to target individuals who commit terrorist attacks in the
United States,24 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") broadened the federal government's power over criminal aliens.
Specifically, the AEDPA expanded the definition of an aggravated felony,
allowed for the early deportation of nonviolent offenders, and limited the
courts' authority to provide discretionary relief and review final orders of
deportation.
25
Before the AEDPA was enacted, an "aggravated felony" was defined as
murder, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking of firearms, money laundering,
crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least five years,
foreign convictions, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit those crimes.
26
With the advent of the AEDPA, an "aggravated felony" includes: 1)
gambling offenses; 2) transportation for the purpose of prostitution; 3) alien
smuggling for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least five years;
4) document counterfeiting or fraud for which the term of imprisonment
imposed is at least eighteen months; 5) an offense committed by an alien
who was previously deported due to a criminal conviction; 6) commercial
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this [chapter] ... to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General." Id.
21. Id. § 1252(f)(1).
22. 143 CONG. REc. S697-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Gorton).
Senator Gorton stated that "[w]e must not allow the cowards responsibility [sic] for such
atrocities as the downing of Pan Am Flight 103, the bombing of the World Trade Center, or
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal building to gain from their actions." Id.
23. Statement by the President upon Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 719 (April 24, 1996).
24. Id.
25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
440(e), 110 Stat. 1276-77 (1996) (codified as amended in section 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
26. KuRZBAN, supra note 8, at 89-91.
[Vol. 22:149
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bribery; 7) forgery; 8) counterfeiting; 9) trafficking in vehicles with
identification numbers of which have been altered; 10) obstruction of justice
for which a term of five years or more may be imposed; and 11) failure to
appear before a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony
for which a sentence of two years or more may be imposed. 7
The expanded definition of an aggravated felony clearly permits the
deportation of more criminal aliens and substantially increases the likelihood
that long-term permanent residents will not be eligible for virtually any form
of relief, no matter how minor their criminal convictions. In accordance
with other amendments aimed at expeditiously deporting the majority of
aliens, the AEDPA facilitates the deportation of nonviolent criminal
offenders before completion of their sentences.28
The AEDPA, in conjunction with the IIRIRA, seriously curtails the
courts' authority to grant relief from deportation, where deportation is based
on criminal grounds. Congress amended section 106(a)(10) of the NA with
section 440(a) of the AEDPA, which revokes the courts' exercise of judicial
27. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e)(1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (Supp. If 1996).
28. 8 U.S.C.A. § 123 1(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997). Section 123 1(a)(4) states:
(A) Except as provided in section 259(a) of Title 42 and paragraph (2), the
Attorney General may not remove an alien who is sentenced to imprisonment
until the alien is released from imprisonment. Parole supervised release,
probation, or the possibility of arrest or further imprisonment is not a reason
to defer removal.
(B) The Attorney General is authorized to remove an alien in accordance
with applicable procedures under this chapter before the alien has completed
a sentence of imprisonment-
(i) in the case of an alien in the custody of the Attorney General, if the
Attorney General determines that the (I) alien is confined pursuant to a final
conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than an offense related to
smuggling or harboring of aliens or an offense described in section
I101(a)(43)(B), (C), (0), (I), or (L) of this title and (II) the removal of the
alien is appropriate and in the best interest of the United States; or
(ii) in the case of an alien in the custody of a State (or a political subdivision
of a State), if the chief State official exercising authority with respect to the
incarceration of the alien determines that (I) the alien is confined pursuant to
a final conviction for a nonviolent offense (other than an offense described in
section 1 101(a)(43)(C) or (E) of this title), (II) the removal is appropriate and
in the best interest of the State, and (III) submits a written request to the
Attorney General that such alien be so removed.
1997]
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review over final orders of deportation.29 Equitable relief for deportable
aliens has also been drastically cut back. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA
amended 8 U.S.C §§ 212(c) and 1882(c), and "provides in relevant part that
section 212(c) relief shall not be available to aliens who are deportable by
reason of having committed certain specified criminal offenses.",30 On June
27, 1996, the BIA decided In re Soriano31 and determined that applications
for relief under 212(c) are barred only if filed after IIRIRA's date of
effectiveness.32  Consequently, section 440(d) should not be applied
retroactively to applicants who were awaiting decisions on appeal prior to
April 24, 1996. Nonetheless, on February 21, 1997, the Attorney General
concluded that it should be applied retroactively.33  The Attorney General
argued that in passing 440(d), Congress withdrew the authority to grant
prospective relief, and she stated that when a statute "either alters
jurisdiction or affects prospective injunctive relief [it] generally does not
raise retroactivity concerns, and, thus, presumptively is to be applied in
pending cases."
3
As a result of the Attorney General's decision, long-term lawful
permanent residents will now be stripped of their ability to remain in the
United States irrespective of the age or nature of their conviction. Ancient
convictions for relatively minor matters will now result in the deportation of
long-term permanent residents without relief. The only bright spot is the
29. Section 440(a)(10) of the AEPDA states: "[A]ny final order of deportation against
an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in
section [1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B),(C), or (D)] of this title for which both predicate offenses are
covered by section [1251(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title], . . . shall not be subject to review by any
court." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (Supp. I 1996).
30. Matter of Soriano, BIA Int. Dec. No. 3289 (1996), 1997 WL 159795, at *1 (Feb. 21,
1997) (Reno, Attorney General) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1996)). "Section 212(c) grants
the Attorney General discretionary authority to admit otherwise excludable permanent resident
aliens. Although the statute expressly authorizes only a waiver of exclusion, courts have
interpreted it to authorize relief in deportation proceedings as well." Id. See Francis v. INS,
532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1039 (4th Cir. 1993).
31. In re Soriano, Int. Dec. No. 3289 (B.I.A. June 27, 1996).
32. Id.
33. Soriano, 1997 WL 159795, at *5-6.
34. Id. at *3. The Attorney General's decision has now been rejected by two district
courts at the time of the submission of this article. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 182
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (striking down the interpretation of the Attorney General in
Matter of Soriano, Int. Dec. No. 3289, 1997 WL 159795 at *1 (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 1997) which
stripped long-term lawful permanent resident aliens, who commit virtually any offense, of
their right to remain in the United States). See also Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Chin, J.).
[Vol. 22:149
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BIA's recent opinion finding that the statute does not apply to section 212(c)
relief or exclusion proceedings.
35
l. FEDERAL CASES AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Decisions Affecting Immigration Law
The discussion that follows involves two of the most highly contested
issues in relation to the recent changes in immigration law: federal
jurisdiction and retroactivity. In an effort to further reduce assistance for
aliens in the United States, with or without convictions, the AEDPA and the
IIRIRA have sought to revoke the district courts' jurisdiction to review
deportation orders issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The elimination of judicial review indicates that aliens may no longer have a
forum in which to argue possible violations of substantive rights. Although
the removal of judicial review under section 440(a) of the AEDPA has been
upheld in several circuit courts,36 constitutional concerns are prevalent.
Retroactive application of newly created statutory provisions and
jurisdictional changes under the AEDPA and the IRIRA are of equal
constitutional concern for thousands of immigrants who otherwise would not
be affected by the new legislation. The cases below will touch on these
issues as they affect the legal rights of immigrants in the United States in
light of traditional common law principles.
1. Restraints on Judicial Review
There are considerable arguments against the revocation of judicial
review under section 440(a) of the AEDPA and the newly created section
242(g) of the INA. In a recent decision by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Senior Judge Weinstein held that there
was "no indication that Congress intended to take the dramatic-and
35. In re Fuentes-Campos, Int. Dec. No. 3318 (B.I.A. May 14, 1997). The BIA held
that before the amendment, section 212(c) barred relief for aliens who "had been convicted" of
certain crimes and that the language of the statute covered aliens in exclusion and deportation
proceedings. Id. at 4. However, section 440(d) eliminated such language and created a "more
limited provision making relief unavailable to any alien 'who is deportable by reason of
having committed any criminal offense... ."' Id. As a result, the statute cannot bar 212(c)
relief to aliens in exclusion proceedings.
36. Ira Kurzban, The Disappearing Federal Courts, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 13.
See, e.g., Boston-Bollers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396
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arguably unconstitutional-step of repealing the habeas statute [section 2241
of title 28] with roots traceable to our nation's beginnings. 37 The district
courts continue to have judicial authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, and
to hold otherwise "would call into question the most basic tenets of our
tripartite system of government. 38 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
"despite the AEDPA's withdrawal of jurisdiction, 'some means of seeking
judicial relief remain[s] available." 3 9
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that section
440(a) of the AEDPA does eliminate the courts' jurisdiction to hear appeals
from final orders of deportation of persons with criminal convictions.40 In
the case of Boston-Boilers v. INS, the defendant entered the United States in
1987 as a lawful permanent resident.41 On June 19, 1992, Boston-Boilers
pled guilty to a charge of second degree murder. 42 By March of 1993, the
INS "issued an order to show cause charging that Boston-Bollers was subject
to deportation on account of his second degree murder conviction. ' ' 3
Boston-Boilers filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit Court,
after an appeal to the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals proved unsuccessful.44 The primary issue was whether section
440(a)(10) 45 prevented the review of the denial of discretionary relief from
deportation of a long-term lawful permanent resident.46
The court held that, upon the President's signature on April 24, 1996,
courts no longer had jurisdiction over petitions pending review on final
orders of deportation of persons with criminal convictions. 47 The opinion
discussed several propositions in support of the holding. First, "passage of
37. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.).
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id. at 161 (quoting Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 837 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
40. Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 353.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 354.
45. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996). Section 440(a)(10) states: "Any final order of deportation against an alien
who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section
241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for
which both predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to
review by any court." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43) (Supp. 111996).
46. Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 354 (11th Cir. 1997). The United States
Constitution states "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
47. Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355.
[Vol. 22:149
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the AEDPA is not [a] retroactive application affecting substantive rights, but
[it] is a prospective application of a jurisdiction-eliminating statute.' 8
Second, the court held that restrictions on the federal courts' jurisdiction did
not violate the Due Process Clause since "[tihe power to expel aliens, being
essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative
and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, with
such opportunity for judicial review of their action as congress may see fit to
authorize or permit."49 Third, section 440(a)(10) was not invalid under
Article I because it is the duty of the political branches of the federal
government to regulate "the relationship between the United States and our
alien visitors."50
In Ranirez-Centeno v. Wallis,51 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the court lacked jurisdiction pursuant
to section 242(g) to review orders of deportation of cases filed after the
Act's date of effectiveness.52  Benito Ramirez-Centeno acknowledged
deportability on February 1, 1991, based on an illegal entry into the United
States in 1990. 53 Ramirez-Centeno petitioned for political asylum claiming
that he had been "a member of the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party" when
he resided in Nicaragua and that he had worked with the Contras in 1985. 54
His claim was dismissed by the immigration judge, and on December 14,
1994, his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was also dismissed.55
Consequently, Ramirez-Centeno requested the district court to grant a writ of
habeas corpus enjoining deportation. 6 The court adopted the Seventh
Circuit's position that "the general effective date of... section 309(a) is 'the
first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after the date of the
48. Id. at 354. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). The court also
indicated that a majority of the circuits have ruled consistently with this decision. See Kolster
v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 791 (1st Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir.
1996); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1842
(1997); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 694
(1997); Qasguargis v. INS, 91 F.3d 788, 789 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1080
(1997); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 400 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537
(1952)).
50. Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81 (1976))).
51. 957 F.Supp. 1267, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
52. Id, at 1269.
53. Id. at 1268.
54. Id
55. Id. at 1269.
56. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1269.
1997]
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enactment of this Act,' or April 1, 1997." 7 Beginning April 1, 1997, the
court would no longer have subject matter jurisdiction over pending cases.
Since Ramirez-Centeno's claim was pre-April 1, 1997, the court had
jurisdiction to hear the case. Nonetheless, the effect of this provision will
mean the withdrawal of judicial review from thousands of aliens who
annually receive orders of deportation.
The government also argued that the AEDPA "eliminated all habeas
review of final deportation orders. 58 As a result, the court did not have the
power to issue a writ in Ramirez-Centeno's case. Section 1105(a)(10) of
title 8, United States Code, as amended by the AEDPA, states that "[a]ny
final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of
having committed a criminal offense [without regard to the date of its
commission] shall not be subject to review by any court."59  The court
concluded that section 440(a) of the AEDPA withdrew the court's power to
grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens who are deportable by reason of their
criminal convictions.60  Specifically, the "amended language of section
11 05a(a)(10) refers only to deportations as the result of criminal activity,
while the original language referred to all deportations."
61
The court also favored a strict interpretation of custody in relation to
orders of deportation.62 The court cited Marcello v. District Director of
INS,63 and stated "that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a require[s] that individuals seeking
relief from final orders of deportation must be in the actual custody of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and not merely preparing to be
deported., 64 Since Ramirez-Centeno had not pled guilty and was not in the
custody of the INS, the court would be unable to issue the writ of habeas
corpus.65 Other jurisdictions, however, have insisted that physical restraint
57. Id. (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 309(a),
I 10 Stat. 3009 (1996)). The Seventh Circuit decision of Lalani v. Perryman, 105 F.3d 334,
336 (7th Cir. 1997), held that "on April 1, 1997 all cases filed and currently pending that fall
within the boundaries of section 242(g) would be dismissed from federal court for lack of
jurisdiction." Id.
58. Id. at 1270.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1996) repealed by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (West
Supp. 1997).
60. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1270.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1271.
63. 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1271. See Marcello v. District Dir. of INS, 634
F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. Ramirez-Centeno, 957 F. Supp. at 1271.
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is not necessary for habeas jurisdiction.6 Although it appeared that the
district court disfavored the attempts at curtailing judicial review, it
ultimately failed to provide relief from deportation.
Another judge in the Southern District of Florida in Tefel v. Reno,67
disagreed with the analysis that section 242(g) revokes the district court's
jurisdiction over orders of deportation 68  Petitioners Roberto Tefel and
others similarly situated, sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandatory relief
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of
Justice, and the Board of Immigration Appeals for denying them the right to
seek suspension of deportation.6 1 On May 20, 1997, United States District
Judge James Lawrence King rejected the government's arguments that
242(g) and other statutes barred judicial review, and, in a lengthy order,70
granted a temporary restraining order.7 ' On June 24, 1997, Judge King
incorporated the May 20, 1997 opinion regarding jurisdiction and then
proceeded to issue a detailed preliminary injunction preventing the INS from
deporting class members. On July 11, 1997, upon the heels of much
criticism concerning the federal government's decision to pursue the mass
deportations, the Attorney General declared that the deportations would not
be effectuated.72 Instead, the administration would introduce to Congress a
legislative proposal that "would enable applicants for suspension of
deportation whose cases were pending prior to April 1, 1997, and who meet
the standards which applied at that time, to be granted such relief on a case
by case basis."73
66. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.). The court
cited to Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995), noting that "so long
as he is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is deemed to be 'in custody."' Id at
164.
67. 972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
68. Id. at 608.
69. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (97-
0805).
70. Tefel, 972 F. Supp at 608.
71. Id. at 620. The court used the traditional four-part test of whether: "(1) there is a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the TRO is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury, (3) the injury to the plaintiff outweighs any harm to the non-movant, and (4) the TRO
would serve the public interest." Id. (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir.
1995)).
72. Carol Rosenberg, A Break for Central Americans, THE MIAMI HERALD, July 11,
1997, at Al, A13.
73. Administration Proposes Finetuning for 1996 Immigration Law to Mitigate Harsh
Effects of Applying New Rules to Pending Cases, Department of Justice, Press Release, July
10, 1997, at 1-2.
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Judge King's May 20, 1997, Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction addressed section 242(g) in relation to the
plaintiff's case.74 The court held that there was "a strong presumption that
the actions of federal agencies are reviewable in the federal courts unless
nonreviewability is explicitly demonstrated in the statutory language. 75
This conclusion is consistent with a long line of Supreme Court cases cited
by the district court.76 Judge King also argued that this presumption of
reviewability is greater in light of constitutional claims that may arise.
77
Based on the statutory language of section 242(g), he also concluded that the
statute did not "bar the review of the decisions or actions of lower level
government officials. 78
Additionally, if the amendments were to deny the power of district
courts to exercise judicial review over claims regarding deportation, aliens
would be unable to have their constitutional claims heard. The plaintiff's
due process, equal protection, and estoppel claims would not be addressed
by an immigration judge or the BIA because they lack jurisdiction over these
matters.79 Furthermore, the district court is the only forum in which a factual
record could be developed for the Eleventh Circuit to review.80  If
jurisdiction is eliminated, Congress would be "intrud[ing] upon the
judiciary's essential function by denying any ,iudicial forum to a plaintiff
who asserts a violation of constitutional rights."
In another unrelated area regarding jurisdiction and aliens, the Eleventh
Circuit recently decided the case of Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman, & Aaronson,
P.A.82 This decision is important in several aspects as it relates to aliens
filing and maintaining suits in federal court based on diversity of
jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit resolved the question of whether "an alien
74. Tefel, 972 F. Supp. at 612.
75. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3, Tefel, (97-0805).
76. Id. (citing Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996); McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 670 (1986); Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1987); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
77. Id. at 3. In Tefel, the judge would later hold that the government's policy inducing
the Nicaraguan immigrants led to the emergence of due process and equal protection concerns.
See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 33-37, Tefel, (97-0805).
78. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4, Tefel, (97-0805). Section
242(g) states in pertinent part, that "no court should have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any client arising from decision or action by the Attorney General."
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
79. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 8, Tefel, (97-0805).
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id.
82. 108 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1997).
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who intends to reside in this country permanently but who has not yet
attained official permanent resident immigration status... should be
considered an alien admitted for permanent residence" within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, Appellant Foy filed a diversity action
claiming legal malpractice against a Florida firm.8 4 However, at the time he
applied, he was not yet a permanent resident; he was waiting for a green card
from the INS.8 5  The trial court found no diversity between the parties
because it interpreted section 1332(a) to include someone who had applied
for a "green card" but had not yet received it, and the person satisfied other
criteria for residency in Florida.8 6 The court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.8 7
The Eleventh Circuit held that the word "admitted" under section
1332(a) applied only to those persons who had been granted lawful
permanent residence by the INS, regardless of what status individual states
confered to aliens residing within their borders.88 Foy could, therefore, be
considered a citizen for purposes of diversity because, even though he had
applied for permanent residency, he was not yet a lawful permanent resident
at the time of filing the suit.
89
B. Presumption against Retroactivity
Another issue which has arisen under new immigration laws is the
question of their retroactive effect. An overview of the traditional common
law principles upon which our legal system has been based will demonstrate
the unsoundness of the retroactive application of the criminal alien
provisions under AEDPA section 440(d) as expressed in the Attorney
General's decision in Matter of Soriano.90 The Attorney General's decision
on retroactivity appears to fly in the face of the Supreme Court's recent
83. Id. at 1348. Section 1332(a) of title 28 states that "an alien admitted to the United
States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1995)).




88. Id. at 1349. The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in its reliance on the plain statutory
language of § 1332(a). See Chan v. Mui, No. 92-CIV8258, 1993 WL 427114, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1993); Miller v. Thermarite, 793 F. Supp. 306, 308 (S.D. Ala. 1992)
(finding that aliens without green cards are not considered permanent residents for
jurisdictional purposes).
89. Foy, 108 F.3d at 1349.
90. Int. Dec. No. 3289, at I (B.I.A. Feb. 1997).
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decisions of Lindh v. Murphy9' and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,92
which clarify and amplify the Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products.93  As the Supreme Court stated in Landgraf. "Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity
to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled
expectations should not be lightly disrupted. 94  Consequently, there is a
presumption against retroactive legislation, and "the court must ask whether
the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment. 9 5 Retroactive application will "create a situation in
which people who have lived in the community, have established themselves
as valuable members of society, and who are needed to support their
families, are summarily deported without regard to the present and future
interests of their families or the community at large. 96 Such is the case of
Tefel.
On February 20, 1997, the BIA interpreted the IIRIRA in regard to the
provisions on suspension of deportation. In the landmark case, Matter of N-
J-B-,97 the BIA resolved the issue of retroactivity created by the language of
the IIRIRA. In a seven to five decision, the court held that, with respect to
the respondent's claim for suspension of deportation, if a person had been
91. 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The Supreme Court held that the amendments of the
AEDPA in relation to habeas corpus reform did not apply to pending noncapital cases. Id. at
2061. This case is significant in regard to the issue of retroactivity, because it re-enforced the
notion that in the absence of an "express command, the court must determine whether the new
statute would have a retroactive effect." Id. at 2062. Since section 107 of the AEDPA applies
special habeas corpus procedures in capital cases and section 107(c) expressly provides that
the amendment "shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act[,]"
the amendments to noncapital cases, which lack such express language, should be applied
prospectively. Id. at 2063. Furthermore, retroactive application would "have [a] substantive
as well as purely procedural effect[]." Id. This is an example of how, without express
language, the Supreme Court will uphold the presumption against retroactivity.
In Mojica v. Reno, the Eastern District Court of New York held that "[w]ithout manifest
congressional design expressed in clear statutory language, the default rule in statutory
interpretation requires prospective implementation." 970 F. Supp. 130, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
The court found that such express language is lacking and that normally Congress has no
trouble in expressing retroactive application of the legislation it creates. Id.
92. 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997).
93. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
94. Id. at 265.
95. Id. at 269-70; see also Hughes Aircraft Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1876 (citing Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (noting that the "presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.")).
96. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 170.
97. Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. BI-173 (B.I.A. 1997).
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served with an Order to Show Cause before he or she accrued seven years of
continuous physical presence in the United States, then he or she was
ineligible for suspension even if the case was on appeal after obtaining
suspension before an immigration judge.98
Specifically, the BIA analyzed section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA as
establishing the Act's effective date as April 1, 1997, and found that section
309(c)(5) 99 created an exception in regard to claims of suspension of
deportation of aliens who received notices to appear before, on, or after the
Act.'00 INA section 240A(d)(1) provides that any period of continuous
physical presence will be terminated "when an alien is served a notice to
appear under section 239(a)."' 0 1 The BIA held that the term used in section
239(a) of the Act was consistent with the formal document titled "Order to
Show Cause" ("OSC"), which is mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1252b. 10 2 The BIA
held that the terms "notice to appear" and OSC were synonymous and that
98. Petitioner's Brief, Matter of N-J-B- v. Reno, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep.
B1-173 (B.I.A. 1997) (No. 97-4400), at 3. Section 240A(d) states:
For purposes of this section, any period of continuous residence or
continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end
when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title
or when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2)
of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under
section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under
section 1227(a)(2) or (4) of this title, whichever is earliest.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
99. Section 309(c)(5) states: "TRANSITIONAL RULE WITH REGARD TO
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION.-Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [section 1229b(d) of this title] (relating to continuous
residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the
date of enactment of this Act." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 § 309(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
100. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. at 19 (B.I.A. 1997).
101. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1997).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a) states:
In deportation proceedings under section 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252], written
notice (in this section referred to as an "order to show cause") shall be given
in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, such notice
shall be given by certified mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record,
if any) specifying the following: (A) The nature of the proceedings against
the alien. (B) The legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted.
(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law. (D) The charges
against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been
violated ....
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252b(a) (West Supp. 1997).
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receipt of an OSC terminated the seven years of continuous physical
presence.I°3
The petitioner contended that OSCs are not synonymous with the new
notice to appear, arguing that a notice to appear was only first used in
section 304 of the IIRIRA.10 4  Furthermore, in INA section 239(a),
"Congress provided extensive and detailed requirements for new notices to
appear[,]" which never applied to OSCs under prior law.'05 In a brief to the
Eleventh Circuit, the petitioner argued that retroactive application of section
309(c)(5) "ignores basic rules of statutory construction, is contrary to the
statute's legislative history, violates principles concerning the retroactive
application of statutes as established by the Supreme Court, and violates
petitioner's due process and equal protection rights." 106  The petitioner
maintained that the majority's holding violated the rule of statutory
construction, which dictates that "[n]o statute may be read as to render any
word or phrase surplusage" when it disregards the phrase "under section
239(a)."' 07  Similarly, by refusing to give the word "under" its ordinary
meaning, the BIA ignored the rule that "legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used."' 08
Concerning the legislative intent behind the amendments, the petitioner
argued that when the House first introduced the bill (the Senate receded
section 309 to the House), section 309(c)(5) provided that the period of
103. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immig. Rep. at B1-178 (BIA 1997).
104. Petitioner's Brief, N-J-B-, Int. Dec. No. 3309, 17 Immigr. Rep. B1-173 (B.I.A.
1997) (No. 97-4400), at 15 n.5.
105. Id. at 16.
Most significantly, § 239(a) requires that all "notices to appear" shall state
"[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held" and "[tihe
consequences under § 1229a(b)(5) [§ 240(b)(5)] . . .of the failure, except
under exceptional circumstances, to appear at such proceeding." Orders to
show cause under pre-IIRIRA § 242B(a)(1) were not required to include
either of these advisals.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G) (Supp. 111996).
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 22 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
108. Petitioner's Brief at 22, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (citing Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S.
129 (1991); INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 (1984)). The petitioner also argues that a
third rule of statutory construction was-violated by the BIA's decision. Id. Specifically, the
rule which dictates that "[d]ifferent words or phrases used in the same statute have different
meanings." Id. According to Petitioner, "[t]he BIA majority violated this principle when it
failed to recognize that only notices to appear served under § 239(a) interrupt physical
presence. It also ignored this canon when it failed to note the distinction between notices to
appear that are 'served,' and notices to appear that are 'issued."' Id.
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continuous physical presence "shall be deemed to have ended on the date the
alien was served an order to show cause." 109  However, the Berman
Amendment, adopted in early 1996, established the current language of
section 309(c)(5) and "intentionally deleted the operative language that
service of an order to show cause ends physical presence."'110 As a result, the
final change incorporated as the legislation, which did not reject the Berman
Amendment, could not have intended to incorporate language it had
previously rejected.
The petitioner finally contended that various sections under the IIRIRA,
when read together, provide a correct interpretation of the relevant statutory
sections. Particularly, section 309(c)(1) states that the old law continues to
be applicable to deportation and exclusion proceedings before April 1,
1997. m Section 309(c)(2) states that the Attorney General may choose to
apply the new law to pending cases where an evidentiary hearing has not
been held.' 12 Similarly, section 309(a)(3) provides that the Attorney General
may, at any time before there is a final order of deportation or exclusion,
109. Id. at 33 (citing 104 CONG. REC. at H10898 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996)). When
H.R. 2022 was introduced into the House on August 5, 1995, section 309(c)(5) provided:
Transitional Rule with Regard to Suspension of Deportation. - In applying
section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect before the
date of the enactment of this Act) with respect to an application for
suspension of deportation which is filed before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of this Act and which has not been adjudicated as of 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the period of continuous physical
presence under such section shall be deemed to have ended on the date the
alien was served an order to show cause pursuant to section 242A of such Act
(as in effect before such date of enactment).
Petitioner's Brief at 33, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (citing H.R. 2022, 104th Cong. § 309(c)(5)
(1995)).
110. Id. at 34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 183-84 (1996)).
111. Id. at 14. Section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA states, "GENERAL RULE THAT NEW
RULES DO NOT APPLY. - Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the
case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title 11-A effective
date .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. I 1996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
112. Petitioner's Brief at 14, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400). Section 309(c)(2) of the IIRIRA
states, in pertinent part:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPTION TO ELECT TO APPLY NEW
PROCEDURES. - In a case described in paragraph (1) in which an
evidentiary hearing under section 236 or 242 and 242B of the Immigration
and Nationality Act has not commenced as of title III-A effective date, the
Attorney General may elect to proceed under chapter 4 of title II of such Act
(as amended by this subtitle).
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
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terminate proceedings and initiate a removal proceeding by serving a notice
to appear under section 309 of the new law. 1 3 According to petitioner, when
analyzed together, section 240A(d)(1) terminates the period of continuous
physical presence necessary for suspension:
"When the alien is served a notice to appear under
§239(a)"... INA § 240A(d) "shall apply to notices to appear
issued before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act
[September 30, 1997]"... [and] when the Attorney General elects
to apply the new law to old cases, old Orders to Show Cause are
effectively converted into the new Notice to Appear under
239(a). 11
In other words, "the prior-issued Order to Show Cause would terminate a
suspension applicant's physical presence only when and if the Attorney
General elected to apply the new law to him under § 309(c)(2) or §
309(c)(3), and actually or constructively served him with a notice to appear
under § 239.'15 The Attorney General suggested she agrees with this view
by vacating Matter of N-J-B-.16
In response, on November 14, 1997, Congress passed legislation titled
the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act, 117 amending section
309(c) of the IIRIRA." The result is a statutory codification of the decision
in Matter of N-J-B-, solidifying retroactive application of IRIRA, with such
exceptions that would provide relief to certain aliens. The Act grants
adjustment of status to permanent residency to Nicaraguan and Cuban
nationals who have not been convicted of an aggravated felony and who
113. Petitioner's Brief at 14, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400). Section 309(c)(3) states:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPTION TO TERMINATE AND REINITIATE
PROCEEDINGS. - In the case described in paragraph (I), the Attorney
General may elect to terminate proceedings in which there has not been a
final administrative decision and to reinitiate proceedings under chapter 4 of
title II [of] the Immigration and Nationality Act (as amended by this subtitle).
Any determination in the terminated proceeding shall not be binding in the
reinitiated proceeding.
8 U.S.C. § I 101 (Supp. 111996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments).
114. Petitioner's Brief at 26, N-J-B- (No. 97-4400) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. II
1996) (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments)).
115. Id.
116. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Newt
Gingrich, Representative, House of Representatives, (July 10, 1997) (on file with author).
117. H.R. 2607, 105th Cong. § 201 (1997) (enacted).
118. Id. § 203
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were residing in the United States prior to December 31, 1995.119"
Furthermore, Guatemalan and Salvadorian nationals who have entered the
United States before October 1, 1990 and September 19, 1990, respectively,
who have not been convicted of an aggravated felony, and who registered for
benefits under the ABC settlement agreement may apply for suspension of
deportation under the previously existing laws.1 20 In addition, the law grants
to persons from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries the
right to seek suspension of deportation under pre-IIRIRA rules, if they
entered the United States before December 31, 1990, and filed an application
for asylum on or before December 31, 1991. However, the law intentionally
excluded Haitian nationals who will have to seek cancellation of removal
under the strict guidelines of the IURIRA or seek remedial legislation
separately.
121
C. Other Policies on Criminal Aliens
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
United States v. Lazo-Ortiz,12 2 demonstrated an example of the rigid123
penalties awaiting criminal aliens . In this case, the defendant unlawfully
reentered the United States after being deported.124 In 1990, Lazo-Ortiz had
committed a manslaughter offense. 12  The government requested that he be
given a sentence enhancement of not less than twenty years by virtue of
section 1326(b)(2) 126 of the Immigration and Nationality Act or under the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines ("USSG"). 127 However, in
1990, the statutory definition of "aggravated felony" did not include crimes
of violence such as manslaughter. At that time, the defendant instead would
have been held to a sentence enhancement of not more than ten years under
119. Id. § 202.
120. Id. § 203.
121. Id.
122. 954 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
123. Id. at 255.
124. Id-
125. Id.
126. Section 1326(b)(2) of title 8, United States Code, states that any alien whose
deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such
alien shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (Supp. 111996).
127. The manual for sentencing states that while the base offense level is eight for aliens
unlawfully entering or remaining in the Unites States, "[i]f the defendant previously was
deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony, increase [is] by [sixteen] levels." U.S.
SENTENING GuImwEns MANuAL § 2L1.2(b)(2) (1995).
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section 1326(b)(1). 128 The court carefully avoided this issue and held that
USSG section 2L1.2(b)(2) was nonetheless applicable.129  Based on the
sentencing commission's guidelines, "all defendants sentenced on or after
November 1, 1991, who have an aggravated felony conviction [are] eligible
for the sixteen-level increase without regard to the date such felony was
committed."' 130 Defendants who have convictions for crimes of violence
which occurred before passage of the new laws will receive longer
sentences. The effect of this policy on criminal aliens is indicative of a
violation of the ex post facto prohibition under the United States
Constitution, since the law enforced did not exist at the time of the
offense.1
3 1
IV. FLORIDA STATE CASES ON IMMIGRATION
The following cases show how Florida state courts are attempting to
preserve the protections afforded defendants in criminal prosecutions. As
federal sanctions against aliens with criminal convictions increase, and as
their opportunities to remain in the United States decrease due to these
convictions, the actions of state courts in vacating convictions becomes
substantially more important.
A. Prosecution of Criminal Aliens
The following cases concern rule 3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires a trial judge to inform every defendant
pleading guilty or nolo contendre that if he is not a citizen of the United
States, he may be subject to deportation. 132 In Hen Lin Lu v. State,'33 the
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (Supp. 111996). Under this section,
any alien.., whose [deportation] was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against
the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than
[ten] years, or both.
1d.
129. Lazo-Ortiz, 954 F. Supp. at 256.
130. Id. Application Note 7 states: "'Aggravated felony,' as used in subsection (b)(2),
means ... any crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, not including a purely political
offense) for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of such
imprisonment) is at least five years .... Application Note 7 to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
132. See, e.g., Hen Lin Lu v. State, 683 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996). Rule 3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
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appellant pled guilty to the charge of burglary.134  In a motion for post-
conviction relief, he claimed that the trial court did not inform him of the
possibility of deportation as a result of the plea. 135 Hen Lin Lu had signed a
preprinted form informing him of the possibility of deportation. 36 The issue
to be resolved was whether a "plea form alone is sufficient to demonstrate
compliance with rule 3.172(c)(8).' 37
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that, although ajudge may use
preprinted forms, he or she "must orally verify that the defendant has
intelligently consumed the written information contained within it.'
138
Furthermore, the court transcripts must affirmatively show that the
defendant's plea was intelligent and voluntary. 39 Upon consideration, the
court found that nothing in the record indicated that Hen Lin Lu's signature
on the form communicated "an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his
rights. , 140
Similarly in Perriello v. State,'41 after a conviction and sentence as a
consequence of a plea bargain, Defendant Perriello, an Italian citizen,
Determination of Voluntariness: Except when a defendant is not present for a
plea, pursuant to the provisions of rule 3.180(d), the trial judge should, when
determining voluntariness, place the defendant under oath and shall address
the defendant personally and shall determine that he or she
understands... that if he or she pleads guilty or nolo contendere the trial
judge must inform him or her that, if he or she is not a United States citizen,
the plea may subject him or her to deportation pursuant to the laws and
regulations governing the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. It shall not be necessary for the trial judge to inquire as to whether
the defendant is a United States citizen, as this admonition shall be given to
all defendants in all cases.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(c)(8).
133. 683 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).




138. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d at 1112.
139. Id. The court examined Koenig v. State, 597 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1992) and State v.
Blackwell, 661 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1995). Id In Koenig, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
nothing in the record showed that Koenig understood the form he signed or that his attorney
told him about its content. Koenig, 597 So. 2d at 258. On the contrary, in Blackwell, the
court found the plea agreements acceptable because before accepting them, the court
confirmed with each defendant that he or she had read the form and understood it. Blackwell,
661 So. 2d at 284. The pleas had been sufficient pursuant to rule 3.172(c)(8) because they
met the intelligence and voluntary requirements. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d. at 1112.
140. Hen Lin Lu, 683 So. 2d at 1112.
141. 684 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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received notice of deportation proceedings instituted by the INS. 42  In
response, Perriello filed a motion for post-conviction relief, asserting that the
trial court did not inform him of the possibility of deportation. 43  The
defendant appealed upon denial of this motion.' 4  The fourth district held
that since nothing in the court transcript showed that the trial judge had
informed Perriello of the possibility of deportation, as required by rule
3.172(c)(8) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant had
been prejudiced and must be permitted to withdraw the plea and go to
trial. 45 Interestingly, Perriello signed a written plea agreement warning him
of possible immigration problems. 146 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that
there was no evidence that showed that he understood the consequences of
his plea because the deportation warning was one short paragraph in a seven
page document and Perriello had minimal English skills and a low education
level. 
147
In another case, the State conceded that the trial court did not inform
the defendant before he pleaded nolo contendre, as directed in Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8), that he may be subject to deportation. 148
As a result of the conviction, defendant Beckles was taken into INS
custody.149 Evidently, the State's failure to inform him ultimately prejudiced
Beckles.
Consistent with the above summarized cases, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held in Sanders v. State,150 that a criminal alien should be allowed
to withdraw her plea of nolo contendere and proceed to trial. 5' The State
failed to inform defendant Sanders of the possibility of deportation before
she accepted the plea.152 The court rejected the argument that, because the
defendant made false statements regarding to her citizenship status, she
should be impeded from alleging error.153 Rather, "[c]ompliance with rule
3.172(c)(8) is mandatory, thus the rule contemplates a trial court will not




145. Id. at 259-60.
146. Perriello, 684 So. 2d at 259.
147. Id. at 260.
148. Beckles v. State, 679 So. 2d 892, 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
149. Id.
150. 685 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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In sharp contrast, the Third District Court of Appeal has relied on strict,
often bizarre interpretations designed to have harsh effects on aliens. In
Chaar v. State,55 the third district affirmed the trial court's order denying
Bilal Chaar's petition for writ of coram nobis.15 6 In 1987, Chaar pled nolo
contendere to possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia.1 7  Chaar
voluntarily left the country under threat of deportation and has now been
denied reentry because of his state conviction.'15  Even though the trial judge
failed to inform the defendant of the possibility of deportation, as is required
regardless of the ultimate immigration consequences, the court bizarrely
noted that Chaar departed on his own will and that deportation proceedings
were not instituted against him as a direct result of the plea.
159
In Ross v. State,'60 defendant Victor William Ross pled guilty to a
cannabis possession charge in 1980, and the trial court withheld
adjudication. 61  In 1996, the INS notified Ross of ensuing deportation
proceedings, which Ross claimed were based on the 1980 plea. Ross
argued that the trial judge failed to inform him of the possible consequences
of pleading guilty.16' Ross asserted that the trial court advised him that the
withholding of adjudication was not a conviction and it should not cause any
immigration problems. 64 There was no transcript of the plea colloquy to
verify these assertions. 165 The court avoided the issue of whether such a
misstatement was an error of fact or law and, therefore, did not decide
whether a writ of error coram nobis was appropriate in this case. 66 The
court affirmed the trial court holding that without a plea transcript, the
155. 685 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
156. Id. at 1038.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court relied on State v. Ginebra, which held that "the trial court judge is
under no duty to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea." State v.
Ginebra, 511 So. 2d 960, 960-61 (Fla. 1987). However, in State v. Sallato, the court left open
the possibility that the defense counsel's provision of "positive misadvice" may constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in deportation. 519 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1988).
159. Chaar, 685 So. 2d at 1038.





165. Ross, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1073.
166. Id. The district court noted that in Malcolm v. State, "[ilt is well settled in Florida
that the function of a writ of error coram nobis is to correct fundamental errors of fact and that
the writ is not available to correct errors of law." Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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defendant could not receive the relief he sought. 67 In effect, the court held
that the government could assert estoppel because of the loss of the
transcript, notwithstanding Ross' affidavit about the lack of notice. Ross
would not only have to assert that "he would not have entered into the plea
agreement but in addition, that had he gone to trial, he most probably would
have been acquitted.' 68 The court then proceeded to entertain Ross' claims
that deportation was unreasonable because of his many years of gainful
employment, long standing position in the United States, since the 1980
incident, and the fact that his children were citizens of this country. 169 Any
analysis of the strength of these arguments went unheard. Rather, the court
found that the proper forum for these claims was the Immigration and
Naturalization Service or the Florida Pardon Board. 170 Yet, under the new
laws of the IRIRA and the AEDPA, Ross will be unable to receive relief
from deportation and a pardon is of no avail.' 7' In contrast, had he been
properly informed of the consequences in 1980, he could have sought relief
167. Ross, 22 Fla. L. Weekly at D1073. The court agreed with the trial court that
"[w]ithout a proper record of what was said during the plea colloquy, it is impossible for the





171. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(48) (Supp. 111996). The statute states:
(A) The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment
of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where-
(i) ajudge orjury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. (B) Any reference to
a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.
Id. (emphasis added). Since the trial court withheld adjudication, Ross has a conviction
pursuant to immigration laws and is, therefore, a deportable alien. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. §
1251 (a)(2)(B)(i), states:
Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or
a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in
section 802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for
one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
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from INS. The Third District Court of Appeals has granted rehearing en
bane in Ross.
B. The Right of Criminal Aliens to Bond
In order to guarantee the protected freedoms of all criminal defendants,
immigration laws that affect the criminal prosecution of aliens will be
strictly applied. The case of Santos v. Garrison,172 shows how the Fourth
District Court of Appeal has preserved the right of bond to all criminal
defendants, regardless of citizenship.173 Petitioner Jose Santos had an initial
bond set at his first appearance and was subsequently released on bond. 174 At
a later hearing it was discovered that Santos was an undocumented alien and
the court immediately revoked his bond. 175  Although the government
insisted that the bond be revoked, the fourth district granted Santos petition
for writ of habeus corpus and issued an order vacating the bond
revocation. 176 The court reiterated that an increase or revocation of bond
may only be imposed if there is a "change in circumstances or upon
information not disclosed to the court at the time bond was previously
established.' 77 In addition, it is the state's burden, and not the defendant's,
to bring any new information to light.
178
The court held that to detain undocumented aliens under section 439 of
the AEDPA, the accused must have been convicted of a felony and there
must be "receipt of an appropriate hold from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for the purpose of taking the individual into federal
custody.' '179  In this case, it was the State that failed to inquire whether
172. 691 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
173. Id. at 1173.
174. Id. at 1172.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Santos, 691 So. 2d at 1172.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1173. Section 1252c(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent permitted by
relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement officials are
authorized to arrest and detain an individual who - (1) is an alien illegally
present in the United States; and (2) has previously been convicted of a
felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such
conviction, but only after the State or local enforcement officials obtain
appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of
the status of such individual and only for such a period of time as may be
required for the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for
purposes of deporting or removing the alien from the United States.
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Santos was an illegal alien and it was the petitioner who acknowledged his
status.80 Furthermore, no showing was made that Santos had been convicted
of a felony, and there was no proof of an appropriate hold from INS that
Santos was to be taken into federal custody.' 8'
C. Probation Condition on Aliens
The Fourth District Court of Appeal held in Madrigal v. State,18 2 that as
a special condition on probation, the presence of an undocumented alien
within the state is not, in and of itself, criminal.1 83 The defendant in this case
entered a nolo contendere plea on several counts, ranging from aggravated
assault on a law enforcement officer to discharging a firearm in public.'8
He was sentenced accordingly and the order of probation required
"appellant, who apparently was an illegal alien, to remain outside the United
States and indicated that being in the United States and particularly Saint
Lucie County shall be a violation of probation."'185 The court employed the
formula found in Biller v. State, 8 6 to determine whether such a condition
was valid. 8 7 Specifically, a condition of probation is invalid "'if it (1) has
no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates
to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality.' 18 8  The court
concluded that the condition was improper because the defendant's presence
in the United States was not criminal.1
89
V. CONCLUSION
The AEDPA and IIRIRA pose new, difficult challenges for lawful
permanent residents and others seeking relief from deportation. The recent
8 U.S.C.A. § 1252c(a) (West Supp. 1997).
180. Id.
181. Santos, 691 So. 2d at 1172-73.
182. 683 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
183. Id. at 1095.
184. Id. at 1094.
185. Id.
186. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
187. Madrigal, 683 So. 2d at 1095.
188. Id. (quoting Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734-35 (Fla. 1993)).
189. Id. The court stated that "'although entering the United States at a time or place
other than as designated by immigration officers can constitute a crime, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325,
the record does not establish that the [defendant's] presence in the United States is in itself
criminal."' Madrigal, 683 So. 2d at 1095 (quoting Martinez v. State, 627 So. 2d 542, 543
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
[Vol. 22:149
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/5
1997] Kurzban / Chaviano 177
federal court cases challenging some of these provisions, particularly in
regard to their retroactive application, have arisen in Florida and have taken
center stage in the interpretation of these laws.
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